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The Family Court: 
An Historical Survey 
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T he New York Family Court this year celebrates its twenty-fifth anniversary. 1 
Hailed as an "experimental" 
tribunal, designed to resolve 
society's most intractable problems, 
including family dissolution, delin-
quency and child negled, the court 
has been perceived as a radical 
development which altered the then 
existing legal rules governing family 
affairs.2 The Family Court Act in-
deed incorporates several creative 
provisions. But the court's founda-
tions were built upon solid 
jurisprudential underpinnings, prin-
ciples which had evolved over the 
course of the preceding century. 
Establishment of the court was 
neither radical nor experimental; in 
reality, Family Court represents the 
latest increment in the development 
of legal principles to protect 
children and adjudicate family 
disputes. In view of the controver-
sies which have surrounded the 
court since its inception, an 
historical silver anniversary analysis 
may be helpful. 
At common law and through at 
least the first generation of of the 
nineteenth century, legal priciples of 
nonintervention were applied to 
children and families. Criminal pro-
secution of a child less than fourteen 
years of age could succeed only if 
the prosecution proved, in the 
words of Blackstone, "Beyond all 
doubt and contradiction" that the 
youth could understand the distinc-
tion between right and wrong, and 
could further understand the conse-
quences of the illegal act. 3 Since the 
burden of proof was extremely dif-
ficult, there were few reported pro-
secutions. The principle, which 
became known as the infancy 
presumption, was applied in New 
* Professor of Law, Pace University 
1 Constitutionally authorized in 1961, the 
court was inaugurated on September 1,1962; 
see L. 1962, c.686. 
2 For example, the relevant legislative com-
mittee commented that the new court " ... 
must deal with sensitive and difficult areas of 
life about which reasonable men and women 
differ. Hence it is necessarily an experimental 
court"; State of New York, Joint Legislative 
Committee on Court Reorganization, The 
Family Court Act p. IX (1962). 
3 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on 
Laws of England, Book IV, Chapter II, pp. 
23-24 (1723-1780); emphasis added. 
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York throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury.4 Even the older child was or-
dinarily spared the extreme com-
mon law punishments; for example, 
an 1823 official New York criminal 
law reporter commented that "the 
lowest period, that judgement of 
death has been inflicted upon an in-
fant in the United States, has never 
extended below sixteen years ... ".5 
Child protective laws were nonexis-
tent: parental discretion reigned 
supreme, precluding legal action for 
eVen extreme child abuse or neglect. 
The doctrine of nonintervention 
began to be compromised as the 
nineteenth century progressed. With 
the virtual abolition of capital and 
corporal punishment in 1796, and 
the substitution of long-term in-
carceration, New York's reformers 
soon perceived the need for juvenile 
treatment and rehabilitation. 6 In 
1824 the legislature incorporated the 
House of Refuge to receive" all such 
children [under sixteen years of age 1 
as shall be convicted of criminal of-
fenses, in any city or county of this 
state, and as may in the judgment of 
the court, before whom any such of-
fender shall be tried, be deemed pro-
per objects". 7 Modeled after the then 
novel penitentiary system, children 
were committed to the House of 
Refuge until majority. Although 
committment was discretionary, 
most children who were convicted 
were henceforth placed in the 
special juvenile facility (given the in-
fancy presumption, the predomi-
nant age population was probably 
fourteen through sixteen). 
Child protective legislation 
evolved somewhat later. Although a 
Juvenile Asylum to house im-
poverished young children was 
legialatively incorporated in 1851,8 
and the. Children's Aid Society was 
founded in 1853 to "rescue" im-
migrant children from streets and 
poorhouses through placement in 
foster homes or farm appren-
ticeships/ major legislative reform 
was a post-Civil War development. 
The late nineteenth century 
witnessed great social and familial 
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upheaval. First, extreme civil war 
casualty and desertion rates caused 
extensive family dislocation. Next, 
the Industrial Revolution removed 
children from farm environments, 
where extended family assistance 
was available, to city slums. Both 
parents, and frequently the child, 
were employed long hours. Last, 
large waves of immigration, caused 
in part by industrializatrion, 
brought impoverished alien children 
to the streets of New York. An 
organized effort to protect children 
from unwhoesome, "unAmerican" 
environments, subsequently 
characterized as the "Childsavers" 
movement, quickly took root. 
Motivated by increasingly inhuman 
housing and employment condi-
tions, as well as an anti-immigrant 
bias, the movement succeeded in 
obtaining the passage of radical 
legislation. Between 1865 and 1885 a 
series of child protective statutes, 
followed by the legislative incor-
poration of religious and nonsec-
tarian child care agencies, altered 
profoundly the legal relationships 
between children, their parents, and 
the state. 
In 1865 the legislature enacted 
the "Disorderly Child" Act,lO a 
statute roughly equivalent to the 
present status offense or PINS 
4 See, e.g., Garrett Walker's Case, 5 New 
York City Hall Recorder 137 (1820); 
however, the Blackstonian principle of 
beyond all doubt and contradiction was 
altered to beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
la~t ft;ported case in this state involving ap-
plIcatIOn of the presumption is People v. 
Squazza, 40 Misc. 71, 81 N.Y.S. 254 (Ct. of 
Gen. Sessions, N.Y. Co. 1903). 
5 Note following People v. William Teller 
and Jason Teller, 1 Wheeler's Criminal Cases 
231,232. ' 
6 See L.1796, c.30, which abolished cor-
poral punishment, forfeiture and capital 
punishment except for murder and treason. 
7 L.1824, c. 126, as amended by L.1826, 
c.24. 
8 L.1851, c.232. 
9 See First Annual Report of the Children's 
Aid Society, 1854, pp. 3-4. 
10 L.1865, c.ln. 
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL JULY 1988 
HeinOnline -- 60 N.Y. St. B.J. 55 1988
legislation; for the first time a child 
could be commited for non-criminal 
behavior. Twelve years later the 
legislature passed an "Act for Pro-
tecting Children", a measure which 
could be characterized as the state's 
first child neglect law.11 By 1880 the 
contemporary triad of major 
juvenile justice causes of action, 
delinquency, status offense and 
neglect, were statutorily in place.12 
The new legislation, which truly 
was experimental, was refined and 
codified in 1881 when the state 
enacted a comprehensive new Penal 
Code. 
In addition, a plethora of child 
care agencies and soCieties for the 
prevention of cruelty to children 
were legislatively incorporated, and 
were granted the authority to 
receive court commitments. 
Simultaneously, the legislature, 
reflecting the policy of non-
incarceration dating from 1824, 
gradually decriminalized youthful 
anti-sodal behavior. A 1905 act 
stipulated that "The commission by 
a child under the age of sixteen years 
of a crime, not capital or punishable 
by life imprisonment, which if com-
mitted by an adult would be a 
felony, renders such child guilty of a 
misdemeanor only ... ",13 Four years 
later, the word "misdemeanor" was 
changed to the newly coined term 
"juvenile delinquency" .14 There-
after, and until the enactment of the 
1978 Juvenile Offender Act, any act 
short of murder committed by a 
youngster under the age of sixteen 
could not be deemed a crime. 
All the measures outlined above 
were enacted as part of the Penal 
Law and were applied by the 
criminal courts. Faced with an in-
creasing burden of child protective 
and delinquency cases, the judiciary 
understandably moved to segregate 
children's cases. The development 
of unique juvenile justice standards, 
such as confidentiality and proba-
tion services, further contributed to 
the need for a specialized judicial 
structure. Through amendment to 
the New York City Charter, 
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separate children's parts of the 
criminal court were established in 
1901;15 within a decade children's 
parts were common throughout 
every urban area. Finally, in 1921 
the state, joining what by then had 
become a national movement, com-
pleted the divorce between juvenile 
and criminal courts through the 
adoption of a constitutional amend-
ment authorizing the establishment 
of separate children's courts or 
domestic relations courts for each 
county.16 
Prior to 1922, juvenile justice 
had jurisdictionally and juris-
prudentially constituted a part of 
the criminal law. Hence the full 
panoply of criminal due process 
rules applied (although the rigorous 
rules may have been relaxed in prac-
tice). The children's courts, 
however, were not statutorily 
bound by the Criminal Procedure 
Law. Litigation to determine pro-
cedural boundaries resulted. In 
1927, the Court of Appeals held that 
crimi'1al due process standards 
nevertheless applied to delinquency 
actions: 
There must be a trial; the charge against 
the child cannot be sustained upon mere 
hearsay or surmise; the child must first 
have committed the act of burglary or of 
larceny before it can be convicted of being 
a delinquent child. The act remains the 
same and the proof of the act is equally 
necessary whether we call it burglary, 
larceny or delinquency. The name may 
change the result; it cannot change the 
facts. 
Our activities in bahalf of the child may 
have been awakened, but the fundamen-
tal ideas of criminal procedure have not 
changed. These require a definite charge, 
a hearing, competent proof and a judg-
ment. Anything less is arbitrary powerP 
But a mere four years later, the 
same court held that criminal due 
process rules no longer applied, ef~ 
fectively overruling the 1927 deci-
sion: "Since the [delinquency 1 pro-
ceeding was not a criminal one, 
there was neither right to nor 
necessity for the procedural 
safeguards described by constitution 
and statute in criminal cases."18 The 
informality and absence of pro-
cedural rights, which became 
synonymous with Juvenile Justice, 
dated only from 1932. 
Such is the legacy of the Family 
Court, at least in synopsis form. 
The framework which today 
governs juvenile justice and child 
welfare proceedings was formulated 
throughout the nineteenth century 
and was largely completed by 1880. 
Organizationally, the Family 
Court's predecessors were the 
children's courts (and the New York 
City Domestic Relations Court) and 
the earlier children's parts of the 
criminal courts. Procedurally, tradi-
tional principles prevailed, at least 
in the main, until 1932. The Family 
Court was not made from whole 
cloth, was not "experimental", and 
did not substantially alter society's 
treatment of delinquency, child 
neglect or other manifestations of 
family dysfunction. The founders 
prudently built upon a long evolu-
tion, augmenting pre-existing 
jurisdiction (adding, for example, 
family offenses, though declining to 
grant the Family Court divorce 
jurisdiction) and strengthening the 
crucial Family Court dispositional 
process. 
Continued on Page 78 
11 1.1877, c.428; another milestone in the 
development of children's laws was adoption, 
enacted in 1873 (L.1873,c.830). 
12 Of course, the early statutes were 
significantly different than their modern 
counterparts: see Sobie, The Creation of 
Juvenile Justice: A History of New York's 
Children's Laws, New York Bar Foundation 
(1987), pp. 43-53. 
13 L.1905, c.699. 
14 L.1909, c.478 
15 L.1901, c.466; the requirement of separate 
court.parts was initially limited to Manhattan 
and the Bronx. 
16 The implementation was achieved through 
the Children's Court Act of New York State 
(1.1922, c.547) and the New York City 
Children's Court Act (L.1924, c.254). 
17 People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 313, 
316. 
18 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 177 (1932); 
a strong dissent was filed by Judge Crane, 
who had written the 1927 Fitzgerald opinion. 
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Continued from Page 55 
This is not to belittle the 
achievements which we justly 
celebrate. 1962 should be heralded 
as the year a state-wide court 
capable of adjudicating most 
disputes involving the family was 
finally established. So too, this year 
marks the silver anniversary of af-
fording counsel to children, a 
measure which New York pioneered 
through the enactment of Family 
Court Act Article Two. 19 Other 
1962 accomplishments include the 
re-introduction of procedural stan-
dards and enactment of the first 
modern child protective act. 20 
Twenty-five years of experience, 
legislation and caselaw development 
has resulted in an even stronger 
juvenile justice system. 
Much remains to be done. 21 
Much remains controversial. Sure-
ly, the rules governing the adjudica-
tion" and disposition of complex 
emotional, familial and societal pro-
blems is one subject in which 
reasonable people may differ. The 
bar, the bench and every concerned 
citizen should be proud of the 
achievements, should explore and 
debate reasonable alternatives, and 
should never lose sight of the court's 
rich history, traditions and poten-
tial. 
19 See §§241-249. 
20 Family Court Act Article Three, now Arti-
cle Ten; the 1962 Act was the first in which 
the parent was deemed the "respondent" and 
the court could order a wide array of child 
protective measures. 
21 For example, the court has received 
neither the resources nor the prestige it needs 
and deserves; to cite another example, the 
representation of children remains inade-
quate in several areas of the state. 
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